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Principles or Skeletons? Mabo and the Discursive
Constitution ofthe Australian Nation
Penny Pether
... the literary critic engaged with law must read the literature of law
through the evidence of its absence, through its repetitions and through
the failures which indicate the return of that which is repressed by law
(Goodrich 1996· 113).
'The memory of Law . as custom and tradition, as precedent and antiquity
- is held and 'sealed' in images, imprinted though visual depiction or
textual figures that bind, work and persist precisely through the power of
the image... ' (Goodrich 1996: 96).
Plantations or colonies, in distant countries, are either such where the
lands are claimed by right of occupancy only, by finding them desert and
uncultivated, and peopling them from the mother-country; or where,
when already cultivated, they have been gained by conquest, or ceded to
us by treaties. And both these rights are founded upon the law of nature,
or at least upon those of nations (Blackstone 1874: 106).
... how far the seising on countries already peopled, and driving out or
massacring the innocent and defenceless natives, merely because they
differed from their invaders in language, in religion, in customs, in
government, or in colour; how far such a conduct was consonant to
nature, to reason, or to christianity, deserved well to be considered by
those, who have rendered their names immortal by thus civilizing




This essay is centred around what is arguably the most potentially
constitutionally radical, and almost certainly the most politically
contentious decision of the Australian High Court in its history.o This is the
1992 Native Title Decision -Mabo v Queensland (No.2). My assessment of
the potentially radical quality of the Mabo decision, constitutionally
speaking, rests on what the judgment refuses to do and thus, paradoxically,
makes imaginable, as much as on what it achieves. I will rehearse the
decision briefly in order to suggest to readers the perspective from which
this essay approaches it.
The (legal) history of Australian constitutional accounting for the
indigenous peoples who inhabited what became known as the continent of
Australia has been written and rewritten, most notably by the Mabo
decision itself. The project of unpicking those rewritings is in a real sense
that which is proposed by the work of which this essay forms part. Thus
this account is both radically provisional, and to a significant extent
compelled initially to take on trust its predecessor texts.
There were of course legal challenges to the doctrine of terra nullius, and
the texts of those cases are replete with evidence of the law's self-
constituting authority (disguised as precedent) and unselfconscious
acknowledgment of its fictionality. This said, the position adopted by the
colonial courts, and by Australian courts until the Mabo decision, l was that
when the British Crown colonised the continent it obtained absolute
beneficial ownership of the lands of the continent together with its
assertion of sovereignty. This latter was authorised by contemporary
theories of international law, themselves the self-serving creatures of
Western European colonial powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth
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centuries. Those theories provided three ways of obtaining sovereignty
over colonised lands: conquest, cession, or settlement.
The colonial taking of Australia was accounted for as settlement of lands
'terrae nullius'; that is, either belonging to no-one, or belonging to no-one
'civilised', or not cultivated in a way recognisable to contemporary Western
Europeans, depending on the account of the theory preferred or
developed at any given time. Acorollary of this was that no system of law
(and thus no system of land law) was recognised as existing in lands terrae
nullius. It flowed from this that as much of English common and statute law
as was applicable to the colony at the time of settlement became the law of
the colony. That law could not, theoretically, be amended by Crown
prerogative, but only by the local (colonial) legislature or the Imperial
Parliament. Thus one aspect of its national or constitutional character, its
partaking in a legitimising legal discourse of nationmaking as against the
articulation of mere executive power.
The majority of the High Court in the Mabo decision found that
contemporary developments in international law, the emergent historical
record which rewrote colonial stories of 'civilisation', and the claims of
contemporary conscience necessitated a rewriting of that legal history.
They found that the establishment of British colonial sovereignty in
Australia only brought with it radical title to the lands of the colony; that
some further disposition had to take place before an absolute beneficial
ownership of such lands was disposed of/ brought into existence; that a
system of indigenous land title would henceforth be recognised by
Australian common law; that indigenous land title, if proven to predate
settlement, could also be proven to persist into the present if it had not
been extinguished by some dealing with the land inconsistent with the
existence of native title - the crystallisation of an absolute beneficial
ownership of the land in question.
Thus, paradoxically, the common law was rewritten to recognise a law
predating it and persisting alongside it, but always subject to subordination
and indeed extinguishment by it. For all that the majority held that' [n] ative
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title to particular land..., its incidents and the persons entitled to it are
ascertained according to [indigenous laws and customs]' (Mabo 1992: 3),
the common law defined the incidents of that pre-existing law, which was
in effect its creature. It is the common law which does the ascertaining. Yet
the common law at the same time refused to question the sovereign taking
of the Australian continent which depended on the same discredited
doctrine - that of terra nullius -which it had subjected to such a revisionary
scrutiny in the context ofland law.
It is a commonplace of accounts of indigenous culture in Australia that
connection with the land is at its heart in a way radically incommensurable
with the non-indigenous Australian legal consciousness (which on
poststructuralist accounts of subject formation shapes and is shaped by
non-indigenous Australians' understanding of land). Standing behind my
critique of the discourses on national identity in the Australian native title
jurisprudence in this essay is the Australian Constitutional Law which might
be reimagined if the High Court were to adopt an Irigarayan 'ethics of
alterity': an ethics of recognition not dependant on displacing or
metamorphosing the other or imagining the other solely in terms of the
self.
The High Court's explicit refusal to address the sovereignty question is,
then, I would suggest, both a critical ethical blindspot in the judgment and
curiously symptomatic. The High Court's protection of the source of its
own (illegitimate?) power as the judicial arm of Australia's national
government and its act of containment masquerading as recognition are
both symptoms of the covert yet insistent assertion of its own (colonial)
power: That the 'Crown's acquisition of sovereignty over the several parts
ofAustralia cannot be challenged in an Australian municipal court' (Mabo
1992: 2) was the one thing on which the entire court agreed.
The Commonwealth Attorney-General, Dr Gavan Griffith QC, suggested in
a speech at St Paul's College at the University of Sydney on 22 September,
1997, that the High Court's decision in Mabo operated as a denial of
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responsibility on the part of the common law for the colonisation of
Australia. If this insider perspective is taken on trust, here again we see
recognition of the occlusion by the Court of its own Constitutional status as
an arm of Australian Government and its concomitant governmental
power. Dr Griffiths' analysis also suggests the profoundly ethically
problematic denial by the High Court that they make the common law; so
too does the language of the refusal to address the sovereignty issue.
I want to suggest at this point the utility of a 'schizophrenic analysis,2 of a
body of legal texts which are critical to an understanding of the
implications of 'native title' jurisprudence for the discursive constitution of
Australian national identity. That analysis would seek in Goodrich's terms
(Goodrich 1986) to read the genealogy3 of Australian native title
jurisprudence constituted by Milirrpum v Nabalco Ply Ltd and the
Commonwealth (1971); Mabo; North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation
andAnor (for and on behalfojthe Waanyi People) v State 0/Queensland
and Drs (1995-6); and Wik Peoples v State o/Queensland &Drs, Thayorre
Peoples v Queensland &Drs (1996), both hermeneutically and rhetorically,
and to employ the work of Diana Eades on aboriginal English as well as
Goodrich's own early work on legal language in generating protocols for a
praxis of discourse analysis with the potential to transform what are at
present the 'publically available ways of speaking' (Muecke 1992: 21) about
Australian sovereignty.
Insofar as the hermeneutic aspect of the analysis is concerned, I want to
suggest what might be gained by unpicking the histories of legal authority
provided by Blackburn] in Milirrpum and the various members of the
High Court in Mabo, Wik and Waanyi, and by other tribunals involved in
the post-Mabo development of Native Title jurisprudence broadly
considered. Such a hermeneutic analysis would proceed according to the





At this point it is worth sketching the significance of those legal events as
background for readers who may not be familiar with the recent history of
Australian native title jurisprudence and legislation. In Milirrpum Justice
Blackburn was faced with a claim by indigenous people in the Northern
Territory that they held a communal native title capable of recognition by
the common law over areas on Arnhem Land and the Gove Peninsula
where the Commonwealth had granted mineral leases to bauxite miners.
The case was significant in that it held evidence by aborigines and by
anthropologists about aboriginal customs, beliefs, social organisation and
indigenous land law were admissible in Australian courts. However, in a
species of Catch-22, Justice Blackburn refused to acknowledge the
recognition of native title by Australian law, in part because of Australia's
status as a settled colony and in part because the title claimed was not one
recognisable as a property right by the (Anglo) Australian legal system.4
The next chapter in the revisionary story of Australia's native title
jurisprudence occurred when in 1982 Eddie Mabo and others lodged a
claim that the Crown's sovereignty over the Murray Islands in the Torres
Strait was subject to their common law land rights. The Queensland
government in 1985 took legislative action designed to defeat the claim. In
the first High Court Mabo decision, (Mabo vQueensland 1988), the Court
held that, assuming the plaintiffs could establish their common law native
title land rights, the Queensland Act was inconsistent with the
Commonwealth RacialDiscrimination Act 1975.
Let us return briefly to the explanatory account of case and statute law on
Native title in Australia post-Mabo (No 2). The Commonwealth parliament
passed the Native Title Act 1993, which provided for a regime for
establishing the existence of native title short of common law litigation, for
determining conflicting claims about land alleged to be subject to Native
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Title, for some avenues for compensation for the extinguishment of Native
Title, and gave aboriginal people a right to negotiate where governments
act in ways which affect Native Title. Some states, including Western
Australia, also passed legislation in response to the Mabo decision. In
Western Australia v The Commonwealth (the Native Title Act Case)
(1995), the validity of the Native Title Act (with the exception of s12) was
upheld and Western Australia's legislation invalidated.
In early 1996 in Waanyi the High Court indirectly left open a door for the
consideration of the question of whether pastoral leases would always
extinguish native title, through a ruling that it was 'fairly arguable' whether
the grant of a pastoral lease in this case had extinguished the native title
claimed by the applicants. The case more directly turned on jurisdictional
and procedural questions arising under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). In
Wik, the High Court held, in a 4: 3 majority decision, with the ChiefJustice
and Justices Dawson and McHugh dissenting, that pastoral leases did not
necessarily extinguish Native Title. The violent and persistent conservative
backlash against the decision found a focus in the 'Ten-point plan' to
amend the Native Title Act to the detriment of aborigines proposed by the
Howard Government. Draft legislation designed to give effect to the plan
has passed the House of Representatives and awaits consideration by the
Senate. There is considerable opinion to the effect that the legislation, if
passed, may be held unconstitutional at least in part.
A concurrent matter has been the dispute between aborigines and
developers over the proposed Hindmarsh Island Bridge in South Australia.
One artefact of that dispute is Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres
Strait Islander Affairs (1996) which marked a sea-change in the way the
High Court majority viewed the persona designata exception to the
doctrine of separation of Chapter III judicial power. Wilson suggests how
~ acutely important a constitutional text Mabo is, for when 'native title'
becomes an officially and undisputably constitutional issue, previous
tendencies to stretch the persona designata doctrine beyond what might
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be considered the rational bounds of interpretability founder in curiously
revealing ways.5
The decision in Mabo has been described by Garth Nettheim in this way:
... the [High] Court, in its first ever opportunity to address the issue
directly, decided by a 6: 1 majority that pre-existing land rights ('native
title') survived the extension of British sovereignty over Australia and may
still survive today provided
(a) that the relevant Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people still
maintain sufficient traditional ties to the land in question; and
(b) that the title has not been extinguished as a consequence of valid
governmental action (Nettheim 1993: 1).
I have given my own account of the Mabo decision above. That account
differs from Netthelm's in its assessment of both the achievement and the
radical potential of the decision, a potential which I am seeking to describe
in this essay. Because of Nettheim's influential position in the legal debates
surrounding native title jurisprudence in Australia, and because Nettheim's
conservative legalist reading of the decision has more recently been joined
by Noel Pearson's strategically conservative analysis of Native Title through
the articulation of a recognition theory (Pearson 1997), it is worth
digressing from my explanatory overview of contemporary Australian native
title law to engage with his analysis.
Nettheim records the intensely critical contemporary responses to the
decision of Aboriginal lawyers such as Pearson (1993: 89), Michael Mansell
(1992: 4) and Mick Dodson:
The Mabo deciSion does not recognise equality of rights or equality of
entitlement: it recognises the legal validity of Aboriginal title until the
white man wants that land.... For the vast majority of indigenous
Australians the Mabo decision is abelated act of sterile symbolism. It will
not return the country of our ancestors, nor will it result in compensation
for its loss (Dodson 1992: 35)
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Nettheim's own reading - and agenda - is rather different. Explicitly
engaging with the conservative backlash against the decision, Nettheim
seeks to account for the decision as consistent with a broad view of the
common law, which he presents as capable of recuperating 'local anomaly'
by 'correction' (Nettheim 1993: 18). His analysis of the Court's treatment of
the sovereignty issue also differs markedly from mine. Nettheim introduces
discussion of the Court's various statements that the validity of the
acquisition of sovereignty is not justiciable in the municipal courts
established pursuant to that foundational act, and then dismisses it, noting
firstly that the court did not need to make the point, as the 'Mabo plaintiffs
did not contest sovereignty', and then that:
The restatements of the proposition that Australian sovereignty is not
justiciable in Australian courts may have been simply a part of the overall
review of the legal consequences of 17886(and the relevant later dates for
South Australia, Western Australia and the outlying Torres Strait Islands).
They may also have been included for reassurance (Nettheim 1993: 20).
This last is a curious and suggestive remark, casting the High Court in
Nettheim's own role here as apologist for and therapeutic champion of the
law. While Nettheim's reading points to the same ethical failure with which
I am concerned, it does not adequately register the magisterial tone of the
Court's monologic rhetoric, nor the narcissistic anxiety which fractures that
rhetoric, an anxiety expressed in the traces of its own consciousness of the
fragility of the authorities on which its self-denial of power rests.
There is perhaps an indication in RASundberg QC's introductory summary
of the litigation in the authorised report of the Mabo judgment (Mabo
1992: 5) that at some point the question of sovereignty was contemplated
as an issue by the plaintiffs, but the principal relief sought by the plaintiffs
as eventually amended did not contest sovereignty, nor yet did the
submissions by their counsel (Mabo 1992: 7-13). It might be hazarded that
to have done so would have courted a rebuff. It is worth noting here,
however, that failure of a party to raise an issue has not stopped courts
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ruling on the issue in question in away central to reaching their decision in
the case in question.
To take just one example, the recent controversial first instance decision of
Newman] in CES v Superclinics Australia Ply lid (1994), a case in which a
medical negligence claim for an egregious series of failures to diagnose a
pregnancy almost became a test case for the legality of the sanctioned
regime of 'legal' abonions that prevails in New South Wales and elsewhere,
is a case in point. But the distinction between what Newman] did in
Superclinics and what the High Court did in Mabo is signal. Newman J's
conclusion that to decide in favour of the plaintiff would be to compensate
for the deprivation of the opportunity to commit an unlawful act was
necessary to his decision. The High Court's aniculation of its position on
the judicial reviewability of the British colonial claim to sovereignty of
Australia was not; it was (symptomatically) excessive.
Not only is decision-making on issues not raised in litigation a
phenomenon which itself complicates the law's assertion of the distinction
between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta, a distinction which functions as a
guarantee of law's unintelligibility to the layperson. In this instance we also
see evidence of the law's characteristically hierarchical and monologic
discourse of self-authorisation - there is no justiciable issue, and yet the
court pronounces the law which is, if we proceed hermeneutically (in
Goodrich's terms), no law at all, but rather a species of excess of its
authority.
It might be suggested here that I am taking Nettheim's initial analysis of
this issue on face value, but there is a more important point to make. With
a project unlike Nettheim's, one that seeks to outrage the law rather than
at once to defend it against its conservative and powerful detractors and to
propose a process of reconciliation between those interests and its own
creature, native title, one can read the High Court's refusal to address the
vexed and persistent question ofAustralia's sovereignty quite differently.
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What I am proposing here serves as an example of the utility of a
hermeneutic reading of these judgments. First, it is at least arguable that
the High Court majority's rejection of the notion that the colonisation of
Australia brought with it as a necessary comcomitant absolute beneficial
crown ownership of the lands of the colony - because of its rejection of the
doctrine of terra nullius - ethically and legally - necessitated a rejection of
the other key legal effect of colonisation justified by the doctrine of terra
nullius: that exclusive sovereignty over the lands in question was also
acquired at colonisation. That is, that there is no logic other than a logic of
power behind the High Court's selective 'reading down' of the effect of its
revision of the common law, as Brennan]'s remarks suggest:
Ifa postulated rule of the common law expressed in earlier cases seriously
offends those contemporary values, the question arises whether the rule
should be maintained and applied. Whenever such a question arises, it is
necessary to assess whether the particular rule is an essential doctrine of
our legal system and whether, if the rule were to be overturned, the
disturbance to be apprehended would be disproportionate to the benefit
flowing from the overturning (Mabo 1992: 30).
Second, Nettheim goes to some lengths to emphasise that the view that
absolute beneficial ownership of land in Australia rested in the Crown after
settlement on the basis of the doctrine of terra nullius is either obiter dicta
or 'bare assertion' (as Gaudron and Deane JJ had indeed acknowledged in
Mabo 1992: 103-4), although at the same time he engages in an imitation of
their Honours' slippage between regarding this as evidence of the
contingency of the authority as well as evidence of its strength (Nettheim
1993: 6). He fails, however, to acknowledge that the same criticism could
be made of the authority cited for the proposition that:
[t] he acquisition of territory by asovereign state for the first time is an act
of State which cannot be challenged, controlled or interfered with by the
courts of that State (New South Wales v Commonwealth (Seas and





My suggestion is, then, that to undertake this 'schizophrenic analysis' at
key strategic sites, such as the various assertions by members of the
majority in Mabo that 'no question of constitutional power is involved' in
the case, (an assertion that I will go on to read in a rather different way
than that apparently intended by its authors) and that 'the validity of the
Act ofState establishing a new colony cannot be challenged in the domestic
courts' (Deane and Gaudron ]], Mabo 1992: 78-9, 95), a task which in its
entirety is beyond the scope of this present essay, would be to expose the
heterogeneous, unprincipled, unstable, contemptuous and essentially
violently hierarchical strategies for the authorised production of legal
meaning which are the bedrock/shifting sands on which the 'common law
of the land' rests.
Let us approach the Court's sole unanimous finding in Mabo from a
rhetorical analytical standpoint, and then from a hermeneutic one. Justices
Gaudron and Deane apparently intend their reference to constitutional
power to mean the constitutional power of the British Crown in 1788 to
annex Australia. I am proposing a different interpretation: one which draws
on the appealingly democratic legitimating legal fiction that at some point
between 1788 and 1986 the authority on which the Australian Constitution
rested ceased to be that of the British Crown and became that of the
Australian people (Australian Capital Television Ply Ltd v Commonwealth
1992: 138, per Mason C)). And one which thus focusses on stories of the
origins and domains of national power. If the High Court is the judicial arm
of the national government established under a Constitution which draws
its power from the assent of the Australian people who are subject to it,
and if the High Court makes the Australian common law, and if it draws its
authority for the proposition that it cannot rule on the legitimacy of the
colonial annexation of Australia from the common law, gestures of largely
wordless impotence in the direction of international law themselves lack
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force. They border on the farcical in a case where the colonial origins of
international law itself, so often occluded in contemporary Western and
liberal democratic discourse on international law, (for example, as irony
would have it, in the Mabo case itselD, are as evident as is the case here.
Let us shift the tack of our rhetorical engagement with the passage in
question. Before asserting that 'it must be accepted in this Court' that the
whole of the territory designated in Phillip's Commissions was, by 7
February 1788, validly established as a 'settled' British colony'(Mabo 1992:
79), Justices Deane and Gaudron note that there are problems even under
contemporary international law with the assertion of sovereignty by the
British over Australia (Mabo 1992: 78). They go on to characterise that act
as an 'act of State whose primary operation lay not in the municipal arena
but in international politics or law' (Mabo 1992: 78).
The clause 'it must be accepted in this court' is both an example of what
Goodrich describes as 'oratorical definition' (Goodrich 1986: 192-3) and a
characteristic judicial employment of a passive construction to efface
lawmaking agency. Further, the doubling of indirection and the imperative
is signal: power is exercised and denied in the one rhetorical gesture,
which operates formally to suggest the Court's own asserted
powerlessness.
There is interesting evidence of the problems for Constitutional theory of
Australia's ironic hybrid of the British and US constitutions in Brennan J's
acutely internally contradictory account of the superior sovereign executive
power involved in the acquisition of sovereignty by a colonising State.
While he stresses that such an 'act of State... cannot be challenged,
controlled or interfered with by the courts of that State' and that such an
exercise of Crown prerogative is similarly exercisable without legislative
mandate, he sources the authority for such acquisition in the common law
itself (Mabo 1992: 31-2).
If we move to a hermeneutic analysis of the assertion that the legitimacy of
the British acquisition of sovereignty over Australia is not justiciable in
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Australian Courts, the High Court's articulation of this principle, cited by
Brennan C] in Mabo, is New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1975).
That statement of 'principle' was made by Gibbs J (as he then was). It does
not however form part of the ratio decidendi of the case. While Gibbs J was
part of the majority which held that the provisions of the Act in issue in the
case which related to the continental shelf were within the legislative
power of the Commonwealth pursuant to the external affairs power, his
decision in relation to provisions affecting the territorial sea and inland
waters was in dissent, and his reasoning on this issue makes clear the
idiosyncratic nature of his conception of the way in which the external
affairs power was attracted by legislation relating to the continental shelf,
and thus of his excursion into analysis of the legislative power which
derived from the novel assertion of sovereignty. In any event, his aside to
the effect that '[t]he acquisition of territory by a sovereign state which
cannot be challenged, controlled or interfered with by the courts of that
state', is obiter dicta, removed from the finding of law necessary to ground
the majority decision in the case.
Justice Gibbs' reference to the 'authority' on which he relies for this last
assertion is revealing. He describes the English cases in question as offering




I should emphasise at this point that while my critique of the Mabo
majority has a significant amount in common with Ian Hunter's, I radically
differ from his contention that 'common law reasoning.... is a specific
intellectual technology, attached to its objects by procedures forged in
practical use, and bestowing expertise only through conscientious
adherence to those procedures' (Hunter 1994: 106). Michael Kirby's
strategies in Wik - of shifting the analysis of native title claims from
aboriginal evidence to the common law1s own (colonial) land rights and the
legal fictions that are the 'rules' of statutory interpretation - both deserve
sustained discourse analysis and suggest the range of possibilities of a
radical hermeneutics of law. They also suggest the problems of Hunter's
account of legal method.
Two possible outcomes of the process of reading native title jurisprudence
hermeneutically might be the reshaping of the law's discourses, institutions
and subjects through a refashioned legal hermeneutics on the one hand,
and a formulation of an ethical juridical practice. Athird possible outcome,
and the one which is my immediate object, is to deconstruct the discursive
constitution of the Australian nation at the colonial sacred site of its
constitutional texts, and especially through the texts which evidence the
emergent national metaphysics of the Mason and Brennan High Courts.
The end to be served by such a deconstruction is to take up the
possibilities offered by Sneja Gunew's critical deployment of Terry
Eagleton's notion ofa 'counter-public sphere'. Gunew notes that
purists who are aware of Eagleton's debt to Habermas's concept of the
public sphere, which is regulated by reason but which allows for a variety
of contending positions, rightly object to the notion that a 'counter'-
public sphere could exist at all (Gunew 1990: 100).
She goes on to deploy the notion of the counter-public sphere as
'comprising a series of discursive formations of legitimizing and
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institutionally endorsed public statements whereas a counter-public sphere
qualifies and interrogates these authorizations.' One of the most attractive
things - in the sense of making possible a transformative discursive praxis in
the project of constructing a national imaginary - about the provisionality
and ambivalence of Gunew's grappling with Eagleton's theoretical legacy is
also characteristic of her essay as a whole. And what I think sets it apart
from many of the essays in Nation and Narration as from more recent
interdisciplinary analyses ofMabo jurisprudence is its carefully self-reflexive
scepticism about the transformed and heteroglot transnational solidarity of
the people imagined as the fruits of the labours of what Bhabha
unselfconsciously celebrates as a 'tribe of interpreters' whose self-
appointed task it is to be the judges of the Institutions and discourses of
cultural studies (Bhabha 1990: 1-7,293). I am as disinclined to take on trust
this coterie of judges as I am the judges authorised by the institutions and
discourses ofthe law.
Rhetoric, Flesh, and Blood
The election in 1996 of a conservative government in Australian has
brought the issue of native title to the forefront of national political debates
-debates which also indicate a return to discredited Australian government
policies of paternalism in relation to indigenous affairs. This essay engages
with that debate by interrogating originary fantasies about legal 'regimes of
truth' sanctioned by Australian courts. It suggests the utility and necessity
of a detailed and contextualised rhetorical critique of the majority decision
in Mabo, proposing that its 'humaneness' and 'activism' were in fact cloaks
for a particularly problematic form of neocolonial practice, and that the
subsequent history of post-Mabo Native title in Australia was predictable
because of the violent forgetting which characterises the majority
judgments in Mabo and which might be most appositely symbolised by
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Justice Brennan's sinister metaphor for the illegal colonisation ofAustralia,
a metaphor which circulates repeatedly in judicial discourse on Native Title
and which appears at its most violent in the following poignant Catch-227
recognition by our common law of the rights and interests in land of the
indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony would be precluded if the
recognition were to fracture a skeletal principal ofour legal system (Mabo
1992: 43).
I want to interpolate at this point one of the troubling discursive fragments
which return or surface in native title discourse, evidence of that which the
law most vigilantly represses: the deployment of its power. I quote from
the Sydney Morning HeraldJanuary 111997:
Mr Fischer... praised the minority judgment of the Chief Justice, Sir
Gerard Brennan, saying Sir Gerard had believed his would be the leading
judgment. Instead it had been largely ignored.... Sir Gerard argued that
Native title was extinguished by a pasrorallease and that it was too late in
the nation's history to argue otherwise.... Mr Fischer said it was possible...
that elements of Sir Gerard's judgment may guide the government in its
search for a solution to the problems the Wik judgment raised.8
What I have described as the predictable legacy of the majority judgment in
Mabo is as follows. The first successful claim under the Native Title Act
1993 was not made until late 1996, although there have been negotiated
agreements made between parties pursuant to the Act, such as the Cape
York agreement, about which I would say no more than there is a
substantial body of largely feminist critique of the implementation of
alternative dispute resolution procedures in cases where there is an
inequality of bargaining power between parties, and that the legislative
framework which sought to structure a 'level playing field' between
negotiating parties, if it was ever effective, needs assessment in the light of
Justice French's reading of the law in the Waanyi case and in the light of
the governmentally sanctioned racist discourse which has been deployed in
response to the Wik decision. The Native Title Tribunal in the Waanyi case
'returned' to the colonial consciousness of Millirrpum. The conservative
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hysteria around Wik has seen a recrudescence of the metaphoricity which
seems a characteristic of settler discourse on native title in such events as:
the Deputy Prime Minister, Tim Fischer's disingenuous statement that
'outlandish' native title claims would 'rip the fabric' of a reconciliation
which the current Federal Government has turned its face against
(Australian 17 January 1997); the Prime Minister's desire for a
'commonsense' response to the Wik ruling (with apologies to Mandy Rice-
Davies, he would, wouldn't he?); and the early favouring by conservative
state governments, which (on the evidence,ofBob Carr's position on Wik)
(Australian 23 January 1997) might include Labor governments, of a
response to Wik that mirrors the ominously-named 'reservation' provisions
in Western Australian, Northern Territory and South Australian legislation
(which allows Aborigines access to leased farm land in a legal 'swap' and
which it seems would be open to the High Court to hold invalid as
infringing one of the few explicit guarantees of individual rights in the
Australian Constitution, characteristically a 'land' right of the kinds
imaginable by the common law, to compensation on just terms for the
forced alienation of property).
Originary Phantasms/Fantastic Origins
This paper opens with epigraphs, the first two of which are taken from the
work of Peter Goodrich, and suggest the utility of his work in generating a
model of discourse analysis for the legal articulation ofAustralia's originary
fantasies. I should perhaps at this point both take a leaf out of Goodrich's
book and also suggest just how outrageous and dangerous to the power of
the law a 'law and literature' analysis might be.
Goodrich has written that 'lilt has been my experience...that the faith or
dogma of law, its distance from subject, person or emotion, is precisely
what precludes the dialogue or the attention to singularity which justice or
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ethics requires' (Goodrich 1996: vii). In October last year I ran, with Justice
Bill Priestley, the judgment writing workshop at Australia's National Judicial
Orientation Program. Two of the texts I set the students -newly appointed
judicial officers from state and federal courts across Australia, and from
some South Pacific states - to read prompted particular outrage. One was
an excerpt from Goodrich's Reading the Law - the section which outlines
the figures of legal dialogue and legal monologue, and thus the section
which I would argue would ground an effective rhetorical analysis of the
detail of the text of native title jurisprudence. The other was the judgement
of the Queensland Court of Appeal in the statutory review of the murder
conviction of Robyn Kina (1993, per Fitzgerald P, Davies and McPherson
JJA, Williams J). In that case, a form of statutory second appeal against
Kina's convistion for murdering a violently abusive de facto spouse, the
Court found that the poor communication skills of Kina's lawyers
effectively deprived her of the opportunity to raise an arguable defence. It
is clear from the judgment that Kina's aboriginality, her sex, her class, and
the class and gender issues involved in her having been a sex worker were
factors which meant that her lawyers shared so little communicative
context with her that they could neither interview her adequately nor hear
and comprehend the information she in fact made available to them.
What was particularly interesting about the attack on Goodrich was that
this coterie of newly-fledged professional interpreters of texts claimed that
a text my first-year students can work with was 'unreadable'. Aclaim that
Kina's case had nothing to do with writing the law came from a woman
judge, one of the few in the program, who had been a successful
commercial lawyer before her appointment to the bench. It seems that
bringing legal subjects, especially those marked by their sexed bodies as
'other' within the institutions and discourses of the law, into proximity with
bodies marked by their sex and race, destabilise what seem increasingly to
me to be law's most tender fictions. Those fictions occlude Australian law's
currently endemic gender and racial bias (to which might be added
homophobia and discriminatory class-consciousness). Destabilising them,
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like instituting dialogue with the law of the other (whose recognition in
Irigarayan terms would necessarily make colonial law in the image ofMabo
misrecognise itselO, sends certain kinds of authoritative legal subjects into
paroxysms of violence which find their particular expression in the
deployment of strategies of deligitimation. Further, as Terry Threadgold
has written, in seeking to explain the 'resistance to (critical) theory' familiar
in humanities departments and increasingly surfacing in legal contexts,
If you have been made subject by the technologies of the self that
characterised the great 'liberal humanist tradition' then your identity is
very much at risk when confronted by a very different story of the nature
of the tradition to the one in which you have always confidently located
yourself. In the new stories the plot has changed -and suddenly you find
yourself not the hero but the villain of the piece (fhreadgold 1993: 8).
Paying attention to embodied specificity and discourses on subject
formation, legal knowledge and national identity in the Constitutional
context puts into question precisely the violent fictions of identity on
which modern national imaginaries depend. By 'analysing that space within
law which asserts or legitimates its legality, a space of self-evidence and so
of forgetting' 'through the evidence of its absence, through its repetitions
and through the failures which indicate the return of that which is
repressed in law,' (Goodrich 1996: 112-3) in the context of native title
jurisprudence in Australia, we might not only facilitate the 'return of that
which is repressed in that jurisprudence,9 - the question of indigenous
soyereignty - but also begin to generate a postcolonial or poststructuralist
constitutional theory of the kind which in Australia as well as in the US.A.
might address increasingly insistent 'citizenship claims' such as the conflict
between 'due process' rights and the interests of alleged victims in sexual
assault cases/o projected federal constitutional challenges to US. state laws
providing for 'same sex marriage', and issues around citizenship and race of
the kind which are presently occupying the US. Law and Literature scholar
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Brook Thomas in his current work on the legal treatment of Asian-
Americans.
I should register here that groundbreaking as I think Paul Patton's (1995a,
1995b, 1996) work on Mabo has been for the articulation of
poststructuralist philosophy with social justice issues in Australia, there is
for me a troubling flavour of Whig history about the different future
republic that he imagines, a more local and particular manifestation of that
which Romi Bhabha desires. Jeremy Waldron's (1992: 24-5) apparently
unconscious, but to this reader egregiously racist originary fantasy -
imagined in the name of metaethics - of the paradigm of Enlightenment
man, that is of the philosopher, should warn poststructuralist scholars of
the dangers of what I will call lying with Rawls, and thus manifesting in a
quite unexpected way (Patton 1995b) the classical liberal's uncritical faith in
the rule of law: that is, of interdisciplinary critiques of law which treat its
fictions as anything more serious than truth claims, a risk akin to what has
been described by Kathryn Trees and Mudrooroo (1993) in this way:
In countries such as Australia where aboriginal sovereignty, in forms
appropriate to Aboriginal people, is not legally recognized,
postcolonialism is not merely a fiction, but a linguistic manouvre on the
part of some 'white' theorists who find this a comfortable zone that
precludes the necessity for political action.
This is also to suggest the particular promise of a 'law and literature' (in the
peculiarly Australian sense of that term) incursion into the territory that is
represented by Mabo might, as Goodrich's recent work explicitly suggests,
have something rather different to offer than the other interdisciplinary
excursions from discplines like philosophy and anthropology which have
proliferated around its borders.
When I describe the High Court's decision in Mabo (to which one might
now add Wik) as 'almost certainly the most politically contentious in its
history' I should connect it with what I see as its predecessors in this
tradition - the prisoners of Parliament case, R v Richards; Ex parte
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Fitzpatrick & Brown (1955), and the cases which in the 1990s discovered
an implied right to free speech in relation to political discourse in the
Australian Constitution (Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills 1992; Australian
Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth 1992). There are two points to
make about these cases. The first is that the free speech cases and
Fitzpatrick &Brown are routinely treated as Constitutional cases. The
native title cases are not, except by self-identified radical commentators. l !
The second is that these cases are contentious precisely because in the
context of what I will characterise as disputes about the civil rights of
citizens they cast into relief conflicts between the judicial arm of
government and the executive. That is to say they are about the power of
governance, and thus reveal the law's constitutional power in away that the
law seeks to keep hidden, as something other than 'merely' interpretive. It
is also to suggest that the slipping of the veil occurs when democracy's
founding fiction - that of a balance rather than an aporia between authority
and the populace, a conflict which Homi Bhabha has characterised as the
split between the pedagogical and the performative (Bhabha 1990: 299) is
destabilised by the insistence of certain demands of subjects who embody a
questioning of the founding fictions of majoritarian democracy.
All this is to identify precisely the kind of encounter with the law that I am
staging:
In the most radical of senses, literature demands the end of law in the
precise sense that in rendering the legal text to consciousness, in
reconstructing the contingency of language and the fiction of a genre
without genre, it questions the difference that demarcates law as a
singular enterprise. Aliterary analysis, in short, promises eventually to
collapse both the modernity12 and the unitary identity of law' (Goodrich
1996: 113).
Diana Eades is a linguist who has done and made available radical work on
the reception and interpretation of aboriginal English in legal settings.
Generally speaking, her research has demonstrated the ways in which the
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English language, 'the primary manipulative tool in the courtroom' (Cooke
1996: 59), operates systematically to read aboriginal signifying and linguistic
practices against the grain and to the material disadvantage of speakers of
Aboriginal English, and to occlude the differences between legal English
and Aboriginal English. It was in significant part her evidence, as well as the
intervention of the Social Worker David Berry and journalists including the
Four Corners researcher Margot Saville which led to the statutory
proceedings which functioned as a second appeal against Robyn Kina
against her murder conviction. Which is to suggest the material effects of a
rhetorical engagement with the law's stories, evidentiary regimes,
sanctioned discourses, and practitioner subjects. What I want to suggest is
that because what happens in the Native Title Case is about radically
incommensurable langues, analysis which makes it evident that
'[s] uccessful participation in the legal process greatly depends on the
manipulation of language' might usefully be deployed beyond the textual
genres which Eades and others have principally worked on - trial transcript,
particularly of the adduction of evidence - in intertextual analysis of the
genres of judgment, evidence, submission, might serve to make evident
that incommensurability, and disable the obfuscation of crude questions of
State power which characterises the language of the Native title judgments.
I should register my consciousness that this process runs some risks. Most
of these risks are versions of the recentring of law, the imagining of law as
therapeutic process in which law itself is the subject. Such risks are evident
in the most interesting legal commentary on Mabo, by Nettheim or Michael
Detmold (1993), say, or even in Dianne Otto's (1995) splendid article. The
other risk is that of forgetting subject positions, investments, interests.
Goodrich's deployment of the feminine itself frequently runs this first risk
in a way that is analogous to much 'liberal' discourse on settler-indigenous
relations. Andrew Lattas (1988: 57) has argued that there is a popular
tradition of discourse on Australian nationalism and the aborigine which
transforms 'the white man's historical repression ofAborigines into an act
of psychic self-repression.... [whereby the] historical violence inflicted upon
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Aborigines by white colonisers is... rendered as a violence inflicted by the
white man against the spiritual sacred part of his psyche.' Lattas' example of
this tendency is Keneally, not coincidentally I would suggest a key player in
the Australian Republican Movement. The same urge to consume the
aboriginal, to eat the evidence of the violent establishment of the Australian
nation, to what Suvendrini Perera (1994: 17) has described as 'happy
hybridisation' is, I would argue, evident in Justices Gaudron and Deane's
characterisation of and curative for Australia's 'national legacy of
unutterable shame.' It finds a more sinister inflection in Justice Toohey's
generally celebrated invocation of Equity in his judgment that the Crown
has a fiduciary duty which should guide its dealings with native title land;
sinister because equity is the jurisdiction in which, historically, powerful
men of law have decided what is good for those whom the law itself
renders powerless: married women under traditional English property law,
minors, the insane, de facto spouses (typically relatively economically
powerless women) after the breakdown of these relationships. Equity
presents the benign aspect of its Janus face, too, in Michael Kirby's
judgment in Wik (1996: 248); we should remember that he, too, is a judge,
and one who wrote in the Wik judgment, apparently without irony or a
sense of mischief, that '[t]here were many reasons of legal authority,
principle and policy for adhering to the understanding of the law which
existed prior to Mabo...'(1996: 250).
Peter Goodrich has recently written that the law is 'a speech or writing
which forgets the violence of the word and the terror or jurisdiction of the
text' (Goodrich 1996: 112). He has also argued, to my mind extremely
persuasively but more through the insistently diachronic genealogy of texts
and authorities which he constructs than through his social psychoanalytic
account of law, that the law is constitued through a characteristic mental
geography. My immodest proposal entails supplementing Goodrich's
territory of the legal imaginary. In what is implicitly the constitutional
context he sees 'the text of the law become... the territory of the realm'
(Goodrich 1996: 103). He writes
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The etymology of text as legal jurisdiction can remind us usefully that
both text and territory as legal concepts have their root in a terror (terreo)
mapped upon the order of the soul and only secondarily upon the body'
(Goodrich 1996: 101).
Robyn Kina's sexed, raced, classed and sexualised body suggests how
destabilising the recognition of the primacy of the Aboriginal body might
be for this hierarchy. Claims for the recognition of aboriginal sovereignty,
that which is unspeakable in the High Court's discourse on native title,
remind the Australian constitutional imaginary that there is something
anterior to the text of the 'common' law and the territory of the realm that
undermine both their foundational claims, that disable the imperial body of
Australian law from remaining 'wrapped in its self-evident and productive
virtue' (PovineIIi 1994: 132).
Notes
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This essay is part of a larger study of discourses on national identity.
David Ritter (1996) has notably challenged this orthodoxy.
Schizophrenic analysis derives from 'Schizophrenic literacy', a term coined by the
author and Dean Bell in their research on legal writing skills tuition. It advocates
analysing the law in a doubled and destabilising way, through identifying what
Goodrich (1986) has labelled its hermeneutics - the protocols for reading and
interpretation that the law sanctions and desires - and combining a hermeneutic
reading of the law with a rhetorical analysis, which reads the law against the grain of
its hermeneutic interpretive codes and practices, according to strategies of
discourse analysis developed in other disciplines.
This list might appear at first blush to herald a linear history rather than agenealogy
in the Foucauldian sense, and the deconstruction of the common law's 'originary
fantasies' involves the unpicking and thus the retracing of those very stories of
origins. However, the analysis I propose seeks in the 'unpromising place' that is the
insistent synchronicity of legal discourse accumulated evidence of the 'invasions,
struggles, plundering, disguises, ploys' from which might be retrieved the
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singularity of certain recurrent constituting stories (Foucault 1986: 76-100). A
Foucauldian reading of the originary fantasies characteristic of the common law -
and particularly marked both in constitutional law and in native title jurisprudence -
has a certain curious appositeness, as it recognizes 'the events of history, its jolts, its
surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats - the basis of all beginnings,
atavisms, and heredities.'
Justice Kirby reprises Milirrpum in a curiously satisfying way in Wik by making his
conclusion that the pastoral leases in issue in that case permitted the coexistence of
native title depend on evidentiary considerations.
See Goodrich's (1995) account of law's repression of the feminine and Stacy's
(1996) analysis of the. Hindmarsh Island affair for insights in to what an analysis of
Wilson might reveal.
Aproposition that seems difficult to square with the repetition of the point and the
florid metaphoricity used to articulate it.
'Blackbirding' is another such usage which is of particular interest in the context of
this paper (Mabo 1992: 19).
The ChiefJustice criticised the then Acting Prime Minister in a letter of 3January,
saying, inter alia, 'I ask you to... consider whether the making of attacks on the
performance by this court of its constitutional functions is conducive to good
government, even if an attack can gain some temporary political advantage.' The
Herald's report of the exchange (Sydney Morning Herald 28 February 1997)
describes Mr Fischer's view that The ChiefJustice's minority judgment was written
in the belief that it would be the lead judgment as speculation.
I should note here that I remain to be persuaded of the superior utility of
contemporary -generally Lacanian - psychoanalytic jurisprudence for the projects of
poststructuralist legal critique, as against that group of generally interdisciplinary
scholarship which emerges from the Foucauldian theorising of discourses and
institutions and Bourdieu's account of subject formation.
10 See Pether 1996, 1997 for an account of these conflicts in the Australian constitional
context.
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11 See, for example, Flood 1997: 2.
12 'In claiming to escape from the contingencies of genre, in forgetting its sources, its
languages, its judges and legislators, law aspires to assume the modern character
and quality of the discourse offate' (Goodrich 1996: 112).
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